Abstract: The ability of businesses to shift regulatory jurisdictions has long raised questions about whether this generates a regulatory race to the bottom (RTB). Prior to the Financial Crisis of 2007-09, the structure of U.S. federal bank regulation raised similar questions, as banks could choose their regulator and regulators received fees for assessing banks. I investigate this question, through the theoretical lenses of bureaucratic structure, regulatory capture and bureaucratic reputation. Relying on quantitative and qualitative data, I find that the initial regulatory structure did induce a regulatory RTB, but once the Financial Crisis had begun, reputational fears on the part of federal agencies reversed the race, as the regulators strengthened standards and brought more enforcement actions. The paper ultimately shows that multiple theories help to explain what is going on with regulatory RTBs.
The ability of businesses to choose their regulators or to shift jurisdictions in order to avoid strict regulatory standards has always raised the question of whether such business mobility results in a "race to the bottom" (RTB) in regulatory standards. The RTB story is that if businesses can choose their jurisdiction, regulators will weaken standards, and compete with each other, so that their individual jurisdictions do not lose the economic growth and job opportunities that come with regulating those businesses. Much of the RTB-related research has focused on environmental regulation and while some research has been on American bank regulation (Corder 2009; Engel and McCoy 2011; Rosen 2003 Rosen , 2005 Whalen 2002 ), our understanding of the dynamics of regulatory competition in this area is far less developed. Because banks can choose their regulator and some federal and state bank regulators are funded by bank assessment fees, critics maintain that regulators have to compete in order to attract banks to their regulatory system. If the banking industry is shrinking, then the regulator incentive is to compete and to weaken standards, but the overall picture is more complex, as regulator behavior is also influenced by concerns of reputation and relationships with those in the bank industry.
Existing studies of RTBs in bank regulation are useful, but have not given a full accounting of what influences potential RTBs in bank regulation. First, studies by economists analyze whether banks seek weaker regulatory standards or enforcement by switching regulators (Rosen 2003 (Rosen , 2005 Whalen 2002 ). In these bank-focused studies, the regulators are static actors, but if they have incentives to compete, they also represent dynamic actors whose actions require examination. Moreover, these studies proceed based on an assumption that, in order for an RTB to exist, banks must switch regulators in search of the lightest touch regulation and a high proportion of those banks must then fail. However, if regulators are truly competing to lower standards, banks that were considering flipping charters may become content where they are, if they benefit from weakened standards. Thus, banks do not need to change their chartering agency for a weakening of regulations to occur.
In political science and law, some accounts have been descriptive (e.g. Corder 2009 ), and some very thorough in their analysis of bank and regulator activity (e.g. Engel and McCoy 2011), yet in neither case has there been a theoretical framework regarding political institutions and the incentives of regulators. It is insufficient to simply assume that the regulatory structure automatically motivates regulators to weaken regulations in order to attract banks. Only if the regulators are motivated to compete with each other to bring banks under their respective regulatory umbrella, is it logical to expect an RTB in standards and enforcement. Thus, we must ask what incentives are generated by the regulatory structure:
do the regulators want to compete or coordinate with each other?
In this paper, I argue that the potential for regulatory competition depends on the interaction of several important phenomena. First, regulators will look to the bank industry, as the number of banks overseen by each regulator determines the amount of revenue, and therefore the budget size. As the number of banks shrinks over time, sources of revenue for regulators decrease, which increases the incentives for regulatory competition. Regulatory competition will come more naturally to Republican appointees, those with a background in finance or banking, or more generally those vulnerable to "cultural capture". Cultural capture is a phenomenon in which regulators view the world of finance through a lens that is sympathetic to those within the industry (Davidoff 2010; Kwak 2013) . This sympathetic view is cultivated largely by repeated interactions between bankers and regulators who share similar ideologies and professional backgrounds with those bankers.
There is a limit to how loose regulatory policy can be, as too much risk in the system leads to bank failures and ultimately, the same diminishing sources of bank revenue that regulators had hoped to avoid. However, the nature of regulator action will depend on what the agency is facing. A need to reduce risk in the system will be met with more symbolic proposals, such as non-binding guidance documents, thus continuing a de facto RTB.
However, legislative proposals that threaten the very existence of the agency will be met with stronger standards and increased enforcement actions. In other words, when dealing with actual financial system problems, regulators will continue to be influenced by cultural capture, but legislative or bureaucratic threats to an agency's turf will produce robust responses in the form of more enforcement actions, as the agency scrambles to show why it should not lose its role as a regulator. Thus, the nature of the banking industry will affect the potential for an RTB, but so will the potential for cultural capture, as will concerns of agency reputation.
The paper contributes to the literatures on public administration and financial regulation by integrating theories of RTBs, cultural capture and reputation and illustrating how they applied to each regulatory agency leading up to and immediately after the financial crisis. Other research has treated each of these theories disparately in their treatment of financial regulation. In this paper, I attempt to bring them together to illustrate how each of conclude by suggesting what future studies of financial regulation might examine.
The Bank Industry and the Regulatory Environment
The structure of financial regulation in the U.S. has caused observers to ask whether it produces an RTB in regulatory standards and the financial crisis of Research has found that banks do switch charters because they seek greater specialization in their regulator and because of legislative changes (Rosen 2003 (Rosen , 2005 , but also when they have a high share of risky assets, low supervisory ratings or when they are about to experience an enforcement action (Whalen 2002) . The latter study provides support for the RTB hypothesis, but these studies primarily examine the role of banks and not of The potential for an RTB in banking regulation depends on the interaction of a number of important factors, but the first feature is a shrinking bank industry. Quite simply, the more banks that a given regulator supervises, the larger will be the potential source of funds for that regulator. As that number of banks declines, either because of bank failures or mergers, it decreases the sources of revenue for the regulator and puts pressure on them to find new banks to regulate. One method by which regulators can make their own charter more attractive is by advertising laxity in regulatory standards. If banks believe that a given charter is going to present them with a lighter touch, they may be convinced to switch charters, or banks that had considered changing may decide to stay put.
Weakening standards will come more easily to particular types of regulators.
Appointees of Republican presidents or people with strong backgrounds in banking and finance are more likely to be sympathetic to the plight of the banking industry and will prevent regulatory standards from becoming onerous. The ability of agency chiefs to shift direction, scope and quantity of regulatory outputs has been well documented in previous research (e.g. Nathan 1983; Whitford 2005; Wood and Waterman 1994) . These studies reveal the direction of regulatory outputs depending on particular regulators, but Kwak In these situations, regulators realize that appearances matter and while bringing strong enforcement actions at this point may represent too little, too late, it has the appearance of doing something serious, potentially serving as a reputation-saving device. Carpenter (2010) has demonstrated that between 2008 and 2010, the FRB did not increase enforcement actions The independent variable of interest is the latent concept of regulators' incentives to either compete or cooperate. I operationalize this concept by examining the number of banks regulated by both the OCC and the OTS. If both these numbers decline, then holding all else constant, we ought to expect a weakening of regulatory standards and/or a decrease in enforcement actions (the dependent variables). I also present a qualitative account of the budget situation of both the OTS and OCC which would be influenced by the number of banks each agency regulates. The budgets in turn would affect regulatory standards. We would not expect enforcement actions, the second dependent variable, to increase over time when agencies are facing tight budgetary times. They would be more eager to attract banks with a light regulatory touch.
To examine the effect of political appointments and potential cultural capture, I
describe the professional and appointment background of each agency chief, and then describe the actions and statements of each of these appointees during negotiations over regulatory standards. To evaluate the impact of reputational concerns on RTB potential, I
look at the task environment as well. Risk and foreclosure rates are gauged by measuring the proportion of adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) issued by banks, as well as the proportion of delinquent mortgages. ARMs carry more risk, as rising interest rates mean more is owed on the mortgage, and as payments become too difficult to make, delinquent mortgages rise as well. As hypothesized, rising foreclosure rates should bring regulator concern, but changes to standards that still fit within the intellectual framework of light touch regulation. Only threats to bureaucratic turf galvanize agencies to create tougher standards in order to save reputation. We should expect to see a similar dynamic with enforcement actions, in that they only notably increase when there is a legislative threat to an agency's turf.
Finally, the methods employed here are qualitative with some quantitative data. First, the events described require thick description and do not always fall into one time category, thus rendering time series analysis more difficult. It is also difficult to capture the effects of appointed regulators through dummy variables. The lengthy period of regulatory standard negotiation means that it is crucial to capture the actions and statements of the regulators during the period, which is more feasibly done by tracing the regulators' backgrounds to their behavior during the negotiations and to the final outcome. Still, even then it is worth noting that disentangling the precise effects of cultural capture from the effects of the institutional structure is difficult. Observing cultural capture means observing the motivations of regulators which means understanding what is in their head. The best we can do to disentangle these effects is a detailed explanation of their actions, along with an understanding of the institutional environment. Finally, capturing the regulators' reactions to the task environment is also captured in greater depth through analysis of particular actions during the negotiations.
Incentives to Compete and Agency Budgets
The incentive of regulators to compete depends on the structure of the market for banking. Competition between agencies will be the more likely outcome if revenue sources concluded, yet it still faced a similar problem to the OTS: a small number of large banks made up a disproportionate share of each agency's regulatory remit, and therefore its operating budget as well.
The OCC also faced increasingly high levels of competition from state bank regulators. Bank assessment fees levied by the OCC and OTS had always been substantially higher than those of their state-level counterparts (Blair and Kushmeider 2006) , as the secondary supervision offered by the FRB and FDIC to state-chartered banks was free to the banks. This often led to the charge from OCC and OTS that state-chartered banks received a "federal subsidy" (Blackwell 2000) . In 2000, Hawke expressed irritation at the fact that state bank regulators were openly promoting their charters and in some cases, telling state banks how much they could save with a state charter instead of a national one (Blackwell 2000) , so he responded by trying to dissuade national commercial banks from switching to state charters (Carter 2001 ).
In summary, both the OCC and OTS had incentives to compete and attract banks into their fold in the early 2000s, but this incentive was probably stronger for the OTS as its very survival was on the line. Additionally, James Gilleran was a strong believer in a light regulatory touch for the banks, which more easily enabled him to attract banks to the OTS charter through weakened regulatory standards.
Incentives to Compete and Changes in Agency Administration
The OTS and OCC made themselves more attractive to banks through federal 
Coordination on Regulatory Guidance
The competition between regulators was also illustrated by the four bank regulators struggling to coordinate their policies in the market for subprime mortgage lending. Such First, the regulators sought to revise CRA rules and guidance which detailed how the law was to be implemented. The CRA was designed to ensure that banks did not deprive poor or minority borrowers of access to credit. All banks underwent examinations to ensure CRA compliance, but banks whose assets were less than $250 million had a simplified and streamlined examination. Prior to 2004, medium-sized banks with assets between $250 and $500 million began to complain about the burdens of complying with the CRA (Linder 2004) , so the four regulators agreed in early 2004 to raise the asset examination threshold from $250 million to $500 million (Gordon 2004) . Despite the proposal's acceptance from smaller banks, the OTS further raised the asset examination threshold for thrifts to $1 billion, with Gilleran stating that he felt "very strongly about reducing regulatory burden" (Blackwell and Bergman 2004) .
The decision forced the surprised regulators to decide whether they wanted to follow the OTS or stay with the $500 million threshold. The FDIC was initially supportive, but also proposed a new community development examination for banks with assets between $250 million and $1 billion (Bergman 2004) . The OCC initially wavered, fearing further criticism after its pre-emption of state APL laws, but ultimately agreed with the FDIC that the content of the streamlined exam should be changed (Blackwell 2004) . Consequently, the three regulators agreed in July, 2005 to raise the asset examination threshold to $1 billion, but they also agreed to the different test for banks with between $250 million and $1 billion in assets (Bergman and Thomson 2005) . Thus, even though the content of the examination was changed, the OTS still ultimately drove the process by staking out a stronger position on regulatory relief and moving the other regulators away from their ideal positions.
In the second area of policy coordination, the regulators dealt with "exotic" or "nontraditional", subprime mortgage loans. These loans required little documentation to apply, were interest-only, and/or had adjustable payment schedules that deferred payments heavily.
They often contained an introductory period, typically two to three years, in which a low or "teaser" interest rate was applied, but once this period finished, the monthly amount owed by the borrower jumped considerably, especially after the FRB raised the benchmark interest Bies both warned about the "payment shock" that ARM borrowers would experience when interest rates suddenly spike (Beckner 2005) . These concerns manifested themselves in the public comments from the agency leaders, but also in the significant increase in enforcement actions seen across the four agencies.
Discussion
Many politicians suspected that the financial crisis of 2007-09 was partly aided by the institutional structure of bank regulation. Allowing banks to choose their regulators, while funding regulators through bank assessment fees, would force regulators to compete for banks, thereby creating an RTB. This paper has addressed whether there was an RTB and the role played by the institutional structure.
The evidence indicates that the institutional structure did play a role, but it was not the only factor and this structure worked in tandem with other factors to produce an RTB that was eventually reversed. The precarious financial positions of the OTS and OCC did initially produce an RTB, as both agencies attempted to make themselves look attractive to banks, through maneuvers, such as federal preemption. However, culturally captured regulators would have been happy to create more lax standards regardless. OCC head John D. Hawke
Jr. was a Democratic appointee, but his counterpart in the OTS, James Gilleran, was very much a banking insider who believed in a lack of regulatory intrusiveness. As time progressed, the Bush Administration was able to make its mark with more like-minded regulators, notably John Dugan in the OCC and John Reich in the OTS. The four regulators, and Dugan in particular, paid close attention to the rising levels of risk in the financial system yet their proposed action never suggested anything beyond voluntary guidance. Thus, the proposed changes still fit the prevailing view of the finance industry, the RTB was allowed to continue, and even rising foreclosure rates through 2007 were not enough to introduce binding standards or to increase enforcement actions. Indeed, only an executive and legislative threat to regulator turf in 2009 goaded the regulators into ratcheting up enforcement levels and "showing their best faces to their audiences…" (Carpenter 2010 ).
Much research on regulatory policy tends to focus on particular theories as having the potentially best level of explanatory power for particular phenomena. In this paper, I have asked whether an RTB existed in American federal bank regulation prior to the financial crisis. The answer required examining multiple theories of regulation that worked together and at times, had more explanatory power than other theories. The influence of institutions helped us to understand the initial drive to an RTB, but cultural capture theory helped us to understand how institutions and personal backgrounds combine to produce particularly business-friendly policies. Finally, agency reputation theory helped us to understand the reason why and when an RTB might stop. Future studies of bank regulation and the postfinancial crisis world will likely need such dynamic examinations that take into the account the effects of various theories on bank and regulator behavior.
